61 THE CHIPS TO SYSTEMS CONFERENCE
SHAPING THE NEXT GENERATION OF ELECTRONICS
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SAN FRANCISCO, CA, USA

ChinaSys

PathFuzz: Broadening Fuzzing Horizons with Footprint Memory for CPUs

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INSTITUTE OF COMPUTING TECHNOLOGY, CHINESE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

BOSC

Open-Source Software and Software Testing

- Software testing research *greatly benefits from* open-source software
  - And the vice versa!

- Linux
- FreeBSD
- MySQL
- PostgreSQL
- Apache
- Mozilla
- OpenOffice
- ……



Source: Shan Lu, 15 Years of Learning from Mistakes in Building System Software, 22nd ChinaSys Workshop.

The Era of Open-Source Chip







Shakti

SonicBOOM[CARRV'20]





XiangShan[MICRO'22]







Beihai[Intelligent Computing]

Hardware Design Verification (DV) is Challenging

≈ (Software) Testing + Verification

50%

Increase in ***design*** engineers since 2007

146%

Increase in ***verification*** engineers since 2007

>50%

Median project time spent in ***verification***

Source: https://blogs.sw.siemens.com/verificationhorizons/2022/12/12/part-8-the-2022-wilson-research-group-functional-verification-study/

The Lockstep Between Design and Verification



Figure. The agile model of hardware design

Source: Yunsup Lee *et al.*, "An Agile Approach to Building RISC-V Microprocessors," in *IEEE Micro*, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 8-20, Mar.-Apr. 2016.

Fuzzing: Automated Design-Directed Verification



Fuzzing: Hardware vs. Software

- **Software fuzzing has been widely accepted and adopted**
  - Highly automated and efficient; significant return on investment (ROI)
  - [AFLplusplus/AFLplusplus] 4 steps: instrumenting, preparing, fuzzing, managing
  - [google/oss-fuzz] As of August 2023, OSS-Fuzz has helped identify and fix over 10,000 vulnerabilities and 36,000 bugs across 1,000 projects.

- **Hardware fuzzing is *more challenging* due to various issues**
  - Sophisticated binary-level input/output semantic
  - High design complexity; similar to highly concurrent programs
  - Low simulation speed/throughput
  - Lack of open-source practice (designs, corpus, crash detection, …)

Fuzzing CPUs: Coverage Increase



Fact: the fuzzer achieves limited coverage increase from the start points

Note: data collected by the LibAFL fuzzer with havoc mutator and toggle coverage feedback from rocket-chip.

Insight[1]: Exploitation and Exploration

- **Literally, mutational fuzzers are *very good at exploitation***
  - Mutators generally create a large number of input cases
- **However, *the exploration is inefficient* when applying fuzzing to CPUs**
  - Reason: instruction set architectures (ISAs) are complicated and sophisticated
  - Recent works improve it with domain-specific knowledge or formal methods

[1] MorFuzz proposes RISC-V specific instruction mutations





[2] HyPFuzz proposes formal-assisted state exploration

[1] Jinyan Xu, Yiyuan Liu, Sirui He, Haoran Lin, Yajin Zhou, and Cong Wang. 2023. MorFuzz: fuzzing processor via runtime instruction morphing enhanced synchronizable co-simulation. In *Proceedings of the 32nd USENIX Conference on Security Symposium (SEC '23)*. USENIX Association, USA, Article 74, 1307–1324.

[2] Chen Chen, Rahul Kande, Nathan Nguyen, Flemming Andersen, Aakash Tyagi, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, and Jeyavijayan Rajendran. 2023. HyPFuzz: formal-assisted processor fuzzing. In *Proceedings of the 32nd USENIX Conference on Security Symposium (SEC '23)*. USENIX Association, USA, Article 77, 1361–1378.

Fuzzing CPUs: SOTAs have done good jobs



Seed Creation

Coverage-Guided Fuzzing

- [SP'21] DifuzzRTL
- [USENIX Security'22] TheHuzz
- [GLSVLSI'22] CFG for Processor
- [USENIX Security'23] HyPFuzz
- [USENIX Security'23] MorFuzz
- [DATE'23] SoCFuzzer

Co-Simulation

- [MICRO'21] Dromajo
- [MICRO'22] DiffTest

Insight²: Ways to Exploring the State Space



Fuzzing Basics



Wider Search Scope

Better mutations



More Start Points

Richer seeds

Start point

Search range

Observations: Fuzzing Horizons are Constrained

(1) *Mutations* are not that effective

Given the seeds S#3 (riscv-dv):



Effective only if targeting 6.2% of input bytes

Further decreased to 2.5% after 1M mutations

(2) *Sources of seeds* are limited

Given the seeds S#4 (force-riscv):

```
0000000080000000 <text0>:  # base
  ......
0000000080000100 <text1>:  # base+0.25KB
  ......
0000000080011000 <text2>:  # base+68KB
  ......
000000008477fff8 <text3>:  # base+71.5MB
  ......
00000000a6411d80 <text77>: # base+612MB
  ......
```

OOM crashes for in-memory fuzzers

Significant slow down fuzzers with corpus on disk

Why: How CPU Fetches and Executes

```
0000000880ca508 <text6>:
  ……
  880ca58c:   1d03d6ef    jal a3,0x8810775c
  ……
0000000088106b20 <text8>:
  ……
  88106b28:   62da92e3    bne s5,a3,0x8810794c
  ……
0000000088107068 <text12>:
  ……
  88107088:   a8de7ce3    bgeu t3,a3,0x88106b20
  ……
0000000088107758 <text15>:
  ……
  88107888:   fec65263    bge a2,a2,0x8810706c
  ……
0000000088107948 <text16>:
  ……
```



This is a case from the seeds S#4 (force-riscv)

Input Format: The Linear Memory



Insight[3]: Linear Memory Hides Execution Paths



If removing untouched memory contents …

- *Mutations become more effective*
- *Seeds' size is significantly reduced*

Footprint Memory: Capturing Execution Paths



PathFuzz: Overview of the Workflow



Refer to our Paper Section 3.2 for more details in enhancing/adapting the three stages.

PathFuzz: Broadening Sources of Seed Corpus

- Modern CPU DV reaches a good coverage; let fuzzers take a step further

- The test cases we are currently using for the system-level DV of CPUs

1) hand-written directed tests

- riscv-software-src/riscv-tests
- riscv-non-isa/riscv-arch-test
- riscv-ovpsim/imperas-riscv-tests
- litmus-tests/litmus-tests-riscv
- josecm/riscv-hyp-tests

2) instruction-stream generators

- chipsalliance/riscv-dv
- openhwgroup/force-riscv
- ksco/riscv-vector-tests
- sifive/riscv-vector-intrinsic-fuzzing
- chad-q/andes-vector-riscv-dv

3) real-world programs

- ucb-bar/riscv-benchmarks
- eembc/coremark
- SPEC CPU® 2017
- SPECjbb® 2015
- gcc,clang,rustc,verilator

PathFuzz: Enhancing DV with Practical Fuzzing

- Incorporating existing, valuable CPU test cases as seeds for fuzzing
  - Extracting the footprints when CPU executes these test cases
  - Using the (short-running) footprints as fuzzing seeds
- Contribution: fuzzing with any start point at any program phase
- How: architectural checkpoints + footprint memory



[1] Nursultan Kabylkas, et al., 2021. Effective Processor Verification with Logic Fuzzer Enhanced Co-simulation. *MICRO'21.*
[2] Yinan Xu, *et al.*, 2023. Towards Developing High Performance RISC-V Processors Using Agile Methodology. *MICRO'22*.

Evaluation

- Setup: famous, widely-adopted, open-source projects
  - Fuzzer: LibAFL v0.10.1 (unmodified QueueScheduler, StdMapObserver, StdFuzzer)
  - CPU design under test: rocket-chip
  - CPU reference/golden model: Spike (riscv-isa-sim)
  - Various seeds, seed count (linear/footprint formats)
    - S#1: riscv-tests, 140 (LM, FM)
    - S#2: riscv-arch-test, 257 (LM, FM)
    - S#3: riscv-dv, 1150 (LM, FM)
    - S#4: force-riscv, 969 (FM)
    - S#5: SPEC CPU2006, 1090 (FM)
- To show the coverage increase, coverage reach, discovered bugs

Evaluation: Coverage



* 95% criteria: formal-assisted HyPFuzz takes 72 hours to achieve 94.9% on CVA6; we take ~10 hours to achieve 95.3% on rocket-chip

Evaluation: Bugs

Insight[4]: *Different seeds help the fuzzer find different bugs!*



Applying Fuzzing to Open-Source XiangShan

欢迎 ChinaSys 社区研究者多多关注开源硬件验证（测试）领域

Version	#Error / #All (seed corpus)	Potential Bug Count
20230905	*** / 50000	5
20230907	**** / 300000	6+ (***/**** analyzed)
20230915	**/1838 (riscv-tests, LM)	Not analyzed yet
	**/3772 (riscv-arch-test, LM)	
	***/2181 (riscv-dv, LM)	
	***/25087(riscv-tests, FM)	
	**/4132 (riscv-arch-test, FM)	
	***/2532 (riscv-dv, FM)	
	***/2196 (force-riscv, FM)	
	***/3751 (SPECCPU2006, FM)	

* Preliminary testing results on unstable versions of XiangShan; do not necessarily reflect the final design verification quality.

Conclusion

- **Motivation**: broadening the fuzzing horizons on CPUs
  - More effective mutations, richer seed sources for better exploration capabilities
- **PathFuzz**: a coverage-guided CPU fuzzing workflow
  - Input format: both linear and footprint memory
  - Incorporate large-scale programs as fuzzing seeds
- **Evaluation**
  - Achieve better coverage increase/reach
  - Detect 4 long-standing bugs in well-known projects
- **Open-sourced** at GitHub with open-source components*
  - Contribute to the reproducible, reusable research community

* https://github.com/OpenXiangShan/xfuzz. Thank LibAFL, rfuzz, DifuzzRTL, SIC, and DiffTest.

Conclusion; Questions?

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